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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of national defence budgets in the post-Cold
War era using a spatial econometric framework. Using data for 124 countries over a
16 year time period, I examine spatial relationships in defence spending to investigate
how countries account for the military spending of other countries when setting their
budgets. Using specially developed weighting matrices, the regression results indicate
that defence budgets are positively spatially correlated. These results provide support
for the use of “external” factors when examining defence budgets over this time pe-
riod. The importance of a country’s spatial location when setting its budget is further
examined through the identification of regions of high and low defence spending.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, spatial econometric techniques are used to access the extent to which, in
the post-Cold War era, the defence spending of countries is positively spatially corre-
lated with the defence spending of other countries. This is accomplished through the
analysis of defence spending data of 124 countries over a 16 year time period.
The results obtained here diverge from those obtained by some authors studying
defence spending during the Cold War. Both the end of the Cold War and strong
economic growth in parts of the developing world have complicated the issue of budget
setting. The polarization of countries into one of two camps is no longer observed. Re-
gional powers such as Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia have developed strong militaries,
complicating the world’s power structure. With this paradigm shift, countries may find
it necessary, and prudent, to factor in the defence spending of other countries when
setting their own defence budgets.
During the Cold War economists wrote many papers examining how military bud-
gets were set. In light of the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union, the
obvious first choice was to develop models where the defence budget of a country was
a function of the defence budget of its rivals, the so called “external approach”. Other
authors instead focused on the political economy aspects of defence budget setting,
known as the “internal approach.”
The modeling of defence budgets as action-reaction processes is traced back to the
1960 book Arms and Insecurity by Lewis Richardson.2 There he develops a model
where the defence spending in country A is a function of the defence spending in
country B, and vice versa. Under this external approach, the primary determinants of
a country’s military budget are factors originating from outside the country’s borders.
These factors can include the spending of potential enemies, the spending of allies, and
the occurrence of war. It is clear why, in the 1960s, one would approach the problem
in this manner. Only a few years earlier, in 1954, US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles announced a policy of “massive retaliation.” This led both the US and Soviet
Union to invest heavily in a stockpile of atomic weapons in order to ensure they would
be able to enact this policy.
Thus, examining the correlation of defence budgets is necessary to provide support
for the external factors approach. I postulate that a further refinement is needed based
on the relative location of the countries in question. Not only will countries respond
to the budgets of potential rivals, but it is important to factor in how feasible it would
2Richardson (1960)
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be for a country to launch an attack on another. This information is captured by the
relative location of the countries. For this reason, spatial econometric techniques are
used, as they easily facilitate this addition.
Many authors have examined whether defence budget data during the Cold War
fits the Richardson model, but their focus on single countries or small regions overlooks
important determinants of defence spending. For instance, Lambelet (1971) looks at
the Middle East. Similarly, Strauss (1978) tries to fit the model to the spending of the
two Cold War Super Powers. Finally, Smith (1980) adapts the Richardson model into
a neo-classical framework and estimates it for the UK. These papers all find that the
defence spending of each of these countries is correlated with the defence spending of
certain other countries. They do not, however, estimate any immediate in-year feedback
effects of changes in spending, and they do not allow for spending from countries not
in the study to impact budgets. By excluding the spending of countries outside the
sample, they assume that a weight of zero is given to the spending of these countries.
In some cases even immediate neighbours receive a zero weight. Thus, although they do
provide support for the external approach to modeling defence budgets, there is room
to pursue the question further. Here, I focus on the potential interactions amongst
a large sample of countries and, furthermore, I factor in a more realistic interaction
profile based on countries’ capacity to engage one another militarily.
The internal approach to analyzing defence spending arose shortly after Richard-
son’s work. It postulated that spending levels were based on the incentives faced by
bureaucrats and politicians rather than the defence budgets of other nations. Nincic
and Cusack (1979) examined the impact that election cycles have on spending, and
found that upcoming elections are correlated with increased defence spending. Grif-
fin, Wallace, and Devine (1982) showed that regressions which include internal factors,
such as the size of the government, GDP, inflation, and unemployment, outperform
regressions which focus solely on external factors. Cusack and Ward (1981) also finds
that internal factors, such as elections, aggregate demand fluctuations, and general eco-
nomic performance, outperform external factors as determinants of defence budgets, in
the US, USSR, and China. Ostrom (1977) compares an external with an internal model
and concludes that both perform rather poorly.
Although there is strong evidence to support the primacy of internal factors in
explaining Cold War spending, it seems unreasonable to believe that the budgets of
potential enemies play no role in the determination of defence budgets. In fact, I
hypothesize that as a result of the uncertainty that exists in the post-Cold War period,
external factors may play a more significant role. International relations have become
more fluid as countries no longer fall into one of two opposing camps. Economic growth
has led to the emergence of regional powers. These are countries who have a strong
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influence over their closest neighbours. The militaries of other countries become a
greater threat when one is no longer certain who ones allies are. For that reason, this
paper focuses primarily on external factors, while controlling for internal factors.
Recently, a number of other papers have also studied post-Cold War defence spend-
ing. Nikolaidou (2008) examines the demand for defence spending in the European
Union from 1961 to 2005, Solomon (2005) examines Canadian defence spending from
1952 to 2001, Looney and Frederiksen (2000) examines defence spending in Latin Amer-
ica from the 1970s through to the mid 1990s, and Douch and Solomon (2014) examines
defence spending for Middle Powers between 1955 and 2007. My focus here is solely
on the post-Cold War period, as the end of that conflict was the beginning of a new
paradigm in global relations. Additionally, some of the data series for the years prior
to 1993 are incomplete, making analyzing the transition from the Cold War era to the
post-Cold War era difficult.
As already mentioned, this paper focuses on the importance of a country’s relative
location on its spending level. Murdoch and Sandler (1984) were amongst the earliest
authors to address this point. An important result that emerges from their study
is the effect that location has on the spending levels of NATO nations, specifically
Germany and Italy as “flanking nations.” Intriligator and Brito (2000) also raises the
issue of geography. They argue that with the end of the Cold War, the behaviour of
regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have become more important to the
study of defence spending patterns. The impact of a country’s spatial location on its
spending levels will be thoroughly examined. This will enable me to identify regions
with relatively high and relatively low spending patterns.
In contrast to the more regional studies, this paper examines a large sample of 124
countries over 16 years. Thus, a spatial panel data model is used. It is only recently
that techniques to perform this type of analysis have been developed. Few authors have
made use of these techniques and none have examined military spending using a panel
data spatial approach.
Spatial econometrics relies on a matrix that captures how a country factors in the
defence spending of every other country. Three such weighting matrices are developed
here, using the capacity of a country to project its military power beyond its immediate
neighbours as the key component. These weighting matrices can be used by authors in
the future to better examine interactions between countries.
The only other author who also uses a spatial approach in examining defence budgets
is Goldsmith (2007). He examines 120 countries for 1991 only. Two weighting matrices
are used: contiguity and inverted distances. He finds there is a positive and significant
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spatial correlation measure, which supports the notion that countries respond in a
positive manner to spending in neighbouring countries.
I extend this approach in two significant ways. First, the analysis is expanded to
a 16 year period. This provides a more robust estimate of spending patterns in the
post-Cold War era. Goldsmith limited his study to a single year, a year that had a
relatively large conflict (the Gulf War), which could bias the results. The use of panel
data also allows me to control for unobserved factors that are unique to each country.
The longer time horizon also allows for an examination of any cyclical patterns and
allows time for countries to respond to the observed changes in defence spending of
neighbouring countries. As the results will show, controlling for these factors provides
a better understanding of defence budgets. Second, and more importantly, weighting
matrices are developed that more accurately reflect which countries each other country
considers as a potential adversary. These changes result in a clearer account of how
defence budgets are set. My results indicate that, given the qualitative structure I
impose on the data, there is strong evidence of positive correlation in defence budgets,
providing evidence of the importance of a country’s relative location and the defence
budgets of its neighbours in the determination of its own defence budget.
An interesting result that emerges from using the spatial approach is the identifi-
cation of different behaviours between geographic regions. As expected, we see that
regions such as the Middle East and North West Africa engage in high spending be-
haviour due to the spillover effect. These results match what casual observers may
have predicted. Perhaps more importantly, however, regions that exhibit the opposite
behaviour are identified. Such zones are found in Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa
and parts of Europe and Asia. Additionally, one can examine the spatial nature of
the spillover effects by examining counterfactual situations. By changing an indepen-
dent variable, one can use the estimated parameters to predict how changes in defence
spending by one country spread throughout the system of countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of spatial
econometrics. Section 3 discusses the data sources for the variables used in the regres-
sions. Section 4 describes the development of a number of weighting matrices examined
in this paper. Section 5 presents the regression results and some robustness checks.
Section 6 discusses the geographical interpretations of the results. Section 7 concludes.
All tables and figures can be found at the end of the paper.
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2 Spatial Econometrics Overview
Spatial econometrics allows for the analysis of defence spending data in a way that
easily and intuitively incorporates the relative geographic location of a country. It is
natural to think that the threat a country’s military poses is a function of how easy
or difficult it is for that country to actually engage in combat operations against the
home nation. If it is believed that countries respond to one another’s defence budgets
in the same period, and if it is believed that the weights placed on these countries are
a function of their relative spatial location, then spatial econometrics is a useful tool,
as it easily incorporates these beliefs.3
Spatial econometric techniques conveniently handle the problems that arise when
the dependent variables in a geographic region is a function of the dependent variables of
other regions. As the number of countries rise, simply adding these dependent variables
to the right hand side of an OLS regression equation leads to too many parameters to
be estimated. Spatial econometrics solves this problem by imposing structure on the
parameters. Specifically, it imposes the restriction that all countries respond with
the same magnitude to a given weighting of the dependent variables of other countries.
Although this condition is restrictive, it allows for an examination of an overall tendency
in the data.
The general spatial autoregressive model (SAR) takes the following form
y = ρWy +Xβ +  (1)
Here, y is the vector of dependent variables, X is a matrix of independent variables,
 is the error term, and β are coefficients to be estimated. The two changes from a
standard regression are W , a matrix of spatial weights, and ρ the parameter estimate
for the variable Wy. In this paper, y will be the defence burden, that is the military
spending of a country as a proportion of total GDP.
The data to be estimated is in the form of an N countries by T years panel given
by Equation 2. Here a spatial fixed effect term, µi has been included.
yit = ρ
N∑
j=1
Wijyjt +Xitβ + µi + it (2)
3For excellent references on the subject see Anselin (1988) and Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet (2008).
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Solving Equation 2 for y reveals that the error terms will not be independent from
the regressors due to the presence of the weight matrix. As such, OLS cannot be used
to estimate spatial econometric models. Others have shown that maximum likelihood
estimation can provide consistent and unbiased estimates.4 As such, this paper makes
use of the maximum likelihood estimation approached, proposed by Elhorst (2003).5
It must be emphasized that ρ is a single value that describes the nature of the
spatial relationship present in the data. It is hypothesized that the value of ρ will be
positive. This would indicate a positive spatial relationship, which implies that defence
spending in a country is positively correlated with that of its neighbours, as defined by
the weight matrix.
The weight matrix is a row-normalized square matrix of size N that describes ex-
ogenous factors which determine how we might expect countries in the world to interact
with one another. A typical element (Wij) provides the relative weight that country
i places on country j’s spending. Examining a row of matrix W provides the relative
weights that a country places on all other countries’ defence spending. If an element
Wij is zero, then the spending of country j is not directly factored into the spending
decision of country i. A larger value indicates that more weight is assigned to that
country’s spending, relative to others.
Another difference between spatial econometrics and standard OLS is in the inter-
pretation of the β coefficients. It is not correct to interpret them as partial derivatives,
as one would with an OLS regression, as this would ignore the feedback effects that are
present in the model. The ultimate effect will depend on factors such as the location of
the country, especially in terms of the number of neighbours and how closely they are
connected.
In order to properly interpret the effect of changing an observation one can estimate
the direct, indirect, and total impact that changing an observation will have on the
vector y. The direct effect is a measure of the impact that changing a single element in
the matrix X, say xir, has on yi, including feedback effects. The indirect effect is the
effect that changing xir has on all other ys that results from the interaction through
the weight matrix. The total effect is the sum of these two values.6
At this point it is helpful to reemphasize why a spatial approach is needed. As
with any regression, if Wy is an explanatory variable in the true model and it is left
out, the regression will suffer from an omitted variable bias. It is reasonable to believe
4See Anselin (1988) Chapter 6 for details.
5For further information on how the model is estimated see Elhorst (2010) and Elhorst (2012).
6See LeSage and Pace (2009) Chapter 2 for equations and further details.
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that policy makers account for the budgets of other countries when they set their own
budget. It is also reasonable to believe that different weights are assigned to different
countries depending on the threat which they pose. Thus, there is sufficient reason to
believe that omitting the weighted spending of other countries would lead to biased
estimates.
3 Data
I focus on the post-Cold War period, specifically the 16 year period from 1993 through
to 2008. There are 124 countries in the sample. Table 1 provides summary statistics
for the data series used in this paper. Data on military spending is obtained from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Spending as a percent of
GDP is the variable of interest, which the literature refers to as the defence burden.
This measure was chosen over a dollar value of spending as it more easily facilitates
cross country comparisons, as it indicates what share of available resources is devoted to
defence. Additionally, the defence burden also allows for a more appropriate comparison
between countries of different sizes.7
Data on the population of each country was obtained from version 7.0 of the Penn
World Tables. A measure of civil liberties is used to identify countries which are more
autocratic than others. The source of this data was Freedom House’s Freedom in the
World index. Their ranking runs from 1 to 7, where lower numbers indicate more civil
liberties and higher numbers indicate a more authoritarian country. They assign the
value based on factors such as freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion, as well
as factors such as the rule of law and economic freedoms.
A dummy variable for whether or not a country was engaged in a war in a partic-
ular year is another explanatory variable. This was taken from the Correlates of War
project.8 A value of 1 is assigned if a country was engaged in an Inter-State War, an
Intra-State War, or an Extra-State War. These measures include wars between states,
wars within a state, and wars between a state and a non-state entity. The lag of this
variable was used in regressions to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Since wars
are often planned in advance, increased spending could proceed a war.
Some internal factors were also examined in the paper. The first is a measure of
7As a robustness check, defence spending per capita is used as the dependent variable, with very
little difference in the results.
8Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
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GDP per capita, taken from version 7.0 of the Penn World Tables. Since military
spending is included in GDP, the defence spending for each year was subtracted from
this measure. This variable is in constant 2005 US dollars.
A second internal factor is economic growth. This is measured by real growth in the
non-military component of GDP. This is computed from the adjusted GDP measure
discussed previously.
A third internal factor found in other papers is the relative size of the government
sector. To calculate this, military spending was subtracted from the dollar value of
government consumption. This was then divided by adjusted GDP. The result was
the fraction of the non-military economy that the non-military government sectors
comprised. The source of government consumption is version 7.0 of the Penn World
Tables.
The final variable considered is a dummy variable for whether an election occurs in
the following year. After determining which elected official or officials are in charge of
setting defence budgets, elections over the time period were documented. If the budget
setter was to be elected in year t, then a value of 1 was assigned to the variable in year
t− 1.
These four internal factors were selected as they were frequently used in the literature
and reliable and complete datasets were available. It was hoped that unemployment
rates could have been used as a fifth variable, however data were not available for all
countries in the study. I made the choice to omit this variable in order to maintain the
maximum number of countries available for the regressions.
4 Weighting Matrices
The appropriate choice of weighting matrix is key for spatial regressions. This matrix
must describe the relative weights that a country places on the spending of other coun-
tries when deciding at what level to set its budget. This paper will examine a variety
of different candidate weighting matrices, which are outlined below. The first two are
used extensively in the cross-country spatial literature. The latter three are constructed
specifically for this paper.
The first matrix considered is the inverse distance between capital pairs of all coun-
tries. This is at one extreme of the spectrum of weighting matrices, as it states that
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all countries factor in the spending of all other countries, however a higher weight is
placed on countries whose capitals are nearer to their own. This type of matrix would
be most appropriate if all countries were major powers in the world. It is conceivable
that countries such as Russia, the US, and China do take into account the budgets of
all other countries to some degree. However, it is difficult to believe that this method
describes the thinking of smaller countries. It is unlikely that a small landlocked coun-
try such as Bhutan would react to changes in the military spending of a nearby small
landlocked country, such as Kyrgyzstan.
The second weighting matrix is at the other extreme of the spectrum. To overcome
the problems associated with the previous matrix, this matrix looks solely at countries
which are immediate neighbours. It is a binary matrix where a value of 1 is assigned
if two countries share a border, otherwise a weight of 0 is assigned. For the purpose
of this matrix, maritime borders are included, as are dependencies. This matrix does
a better job at describing which countries smaller nations factor in when setting their
budget. On the other hand, it also implies that the US would not factor in the budgets
of China or Russia, a difficult assumption to accept.
To find a more plausible weighting matrix, countries are classified into two groups.
The first group includes countries that have the ability to project their military power
worldwide. These countries are typically classified as middle powers, regional powers, or
super powers. They are denoted as Type P countries. The second group includes those
countries which do not fit into the first category. These are labeled Type Q countries.
In order to determine which countries fall into the former category, the military
equipment of countries in 2010 is examined. This data is obtained from The Military
Balance, a publication which lists the military assets of every country in the world.9
This data will be used to determine which countries have the ability to project their
power beyond their immediate neighbours. There are four criteria which are examined.
A measure of the projection power of the navy, a measure of the size of the air transport
capabilities, a measure of air combat capabilities, and a measure of mobility of the army.
The first measure examined is the size of the navy. Modern navies have many
different vessels, which specialize in a number of different capabilities. A satisfactory
measure of the navy is not simply the number of ships, as this number can easily be
inflated with the purchase of smaller patrol or coastal vessels. The desired measure is
the number of oceangoing ships, sometimes referred to as the size of the Blue Water
navy. We wish to know the number of ships each country has that are classified as one
of the following: Submarine (both tactical or strategic, but not midget), aircraft carrier
9International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010)
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(including helicopter carriers), cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and amphibious ships (but
not amphibious craft), as these are the classes of ships that can be used to project sea
power around the globe.
Out of the 124 countries considered, 59 countries in the dataset have at least 1 ship
of the types listed above. Countries which have 10 or more of these ships are classified as
being able to project power with their navy. I find that 32 countries meet this criteria.
Next the size of the air force is examined. There are two measures of interest. The
first is a measure of the air lift capabilities of the countries. If countries do not border
one another, and do not have permission to travel through neutral countries to engage
potential enemies, then they must either travel by ship or by air. Thus, a measure of
the number of transport aircraft per country is needed.
The data shows 115 of the countries have at least 1 fixed wing transport aircraft. A
cutoff point of 50 planes is used to determine which countries had the ability to project
their military power worldwide. This cutoff resulted in 33 countries which satisfy the
criteria.
The second component of the air force is the number of fixed-wing combat aircraft.
In 2010, 93 of the countries examined have at least 1 combat aircraft. A cutoff of 100
combat aircraft is used to identify power projection capability in this dimension. This
leaves 34 countries who meet this criteria.
Finally, the mobility of the armies is examined. In modern warfare, there is a need
for military vehicles. Speed and maneuverability have been shown to be essential to
engaging in combat operations. As such, countries which have a large number of military
vehicles are able to engage in combat operations abroad. There are many different
classifications of military vehicles, but only the following types are included: Main
battle tanks, light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, armoured infantry fighting vehicles,
armoured personnel carriers, and armoured assault vehicles.
All but 5 countries in the data set have at least 1 vehicle of any of these types.
The measure of 1000 vehicles is the chosen cutoff point. This leaves 47 countries which
satisfy this criteria. Table 2 summarizes the above information.
There are 58 countries which satisfy at least one of these four criteria. Of these, 18
satisfy all four, 29 satisfy three or more, 41 satisfy two or more, and 58 satisfy only one.
Countries which satisfy at least 3 of these criteria, are identified as countries with the
ability to project their power globally. Table 3 lists these Type P countries and how
many of the four criteria they satisfy.
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Now that countries that can project their power have been identified, the next step
is to determine how these countries interact with the other countries of the world. There
are three hypotheses that are all examined in this paper.
The first, is that two groups ignore one another. In this W matrix, countries that
are type P, assign a value of 1 to other type P countries, and a value of 0 to type Q
countries, except if they share a border with that country, then they get a 1. Type
Qs assign a value of 1 to countries with which they share a border, regardless of type.
This matrix assumes that all countries care about what their immediate neighbours are
doing, whether they are type P or type Q. Additionally, type Q countries believe that
they could not compete militarily with type P countries, so they do not even bother
to try. They simply ignore the actions of these countries. Meanwhile, type P countries
view other type P countries as potential threats. This matrix is given the label, “Two
Groups.”
The second method, has type P countries interacting with all other countries, and
type Q interacting with only their neighbours. This can be viewed as a world policing
story. By acquiring the equipment to intervene anywhere in the world it is possible that
type P countries have shown their desire to act as a global police force. Thus, these
countries would be interested in the choices of all other countries, so that they can
maintain the necessary equipment to intervene in any country. Again, type Q countries
care only about their immediate neighbours, as they have determined that they cannot
compete with the level of spending of these type P countries. This matrix is entitled,
“World Police.”
The final method, is to have all countries give a positive weight to type P countries.
In this case, countries care about those countries that can threaten them, that is their
immediate neighbours and all countries who possess the military capability to project
their power. So, type P countries care about the actions of all type P countries, and
their immediate neighbours. The difference now though, is that type Q countries factor
in the spending of type P countries. It is logical to assume that countries would be
interested in responding to the actions of those countries who could pose a threat. This
matrix is entitled, “Who Can Get Me?”
These three matrices are further augmented by replacing the pairs assigned a value
of 1 with the inverted distance between the two countries’ capitals. This helps to
capture the importance of regional powers.
A second change that is made, in this case to all five weighting matrices, is to
control for alliances. A few issues arise in this regard. The first issue is in identifying
what qualifies as an alliance. Certain countries work closely with one another, without
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formalizing their relationship with a treaty. Others are in larger alliances, including
some countries with which they are not on good terms. Other treaties, such as the
African Union, contain provisions for mutual security that in practice are not binding.
Thus, only formal alliances which have proven records or are, up to now, untested are
included. Table 4 lists the alliances factored into the weighting matrices.
The second issue is that alliances change over the examined time period. Some
alliances grow, while others contract. Since it is not possible to allow the weighting
matrix to change over time, a decision as to which countries should be included in the
alliance must be made. If the country was in the alliance for more than half the period,
it is included. The justification is that the process of entering into an alliance often
takes a few years, so for most of the period the countries already in the alliance would
not view the potential new entrant as a threat.
The final issue involves what weight an ally should receive in the matrix. It was
decided that if two countries are allied, that a zero weight will be applied.
One final augmentation is that the matrices are row normalized. That is each,
element of the matrix is divided by the sum of the elements in its row. This is a
standard practice in spatial econometrics. The result is that the sum of the weights
placed on all other countries by a single country, sum to one. If a row is all zeroes, then
no change is made.
Therefore, there are five weighting matrices that serve as potential candidates for
describing the true state of the world. Testing will be conducted using all five of
the matrices. Table 5 summarizes the matrices. It should be noted, that my preferred
specifications are the “Two Groups” and “World Police” matrices. The inverse distance
and contiguous matrices have problems that have been addressed above. The “Who Can
Get Me?” matrix is an improvement over these two, and is rather intuitive, however I
believe that it is not the best representation of the behaviour of smaller nations, as it
assumes they react to the actions of all Type P countries, which is difficult to believe.
5 Results
Since there are five weighting matrices that serve as potential candidates to describe
the true state of the world, there are a number of regression results to examine. Table
6 presents the regression results across the five weighting matrices using logged popula-
tion, a dummy variable for war in the previous period, and a measure of civil liberties as
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regressors. The key result obtained here is that the coefficient on the weighted defence
spending of other nations is positive and significant across all five weight matrices, as
hypothesized.
Comparing the two extremes, the estimates of ρ fall between 0.6265 in the case
where all non-allied countries receive a positive weight, to a low of 0.1951 where only
non-allied bordering countries receive a positive weight. The estimate of ρ in the other
three cases fall between these two values. In the case of the “Who can get me” matrix,
the estimate of ρ is higher than in the other two power projection matrices. This is not
unexpected as this matrix is closer in nature to the inverse distance matrix, as there are
more non-zero values. It is believed that the value for ρ is higher in the two cases where
there are more non-zero elements in the weighting matrix as the regression is measuring
a spurious relationship rather than countries actually responding to one another.
Although ρ is not a correlation coefficient, it does still hold that larger values im-
ply increased correlation. This provides strong evidence that the defence spending of
countries is indeed positively correlated with that of its neighbours in the post-Cold
War era. The value of 0.6265 indicates that if all other countries independently raised
their defence burden by 1% of GDP, then there would be an expected immediate rise
in defence spending of 0.6265% of GDP in the remaining country. The ultimate rise in
spending would be greater as all countries would wish to react to each other’s spending
change.
The regression results indicate that increases in population are correlated with in-
creased defence burdens, albeit at a small rate. Being in a war in the previous period
is also correlated with higher spending levels. Finally, a reduction in civil liberties is
also associated with a higher defence burden. In order to measure the magnitudes of
these correlations, one must account for the feedback effects associated with a spatial
model. Table 7 provides estimates of the direct, indirect, and total effect of a change
in these variables.
Examining population first, one observes that the total effect of an increase in
population ranges from 0.0577 to 0.0118. The main difference between the estimates
coming from the indirect effects of a change, that is the change in spending in other
countries. Focusing on the “Two Groups” case, an increase in population of 10% in
country i would lead to an increase in defence burden in that country of less than one
tenth of one percent. If country i’s defence burden was 2.5% prior to the change, its
new defence burden would be 2.502%. The indirect effect is even smaller. Population
thus does not appear to be a significant determinant of defence burden.
The effect of being in a war has a much larger impact on the defence burden, as
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might be expected. Countries that engage in war are expected to devote more resources
to defence for three reasons. First, there is a cost from expending munitions and from
increased maintenance on weapon systems. Second, a country that was in a war in the
previous period may still be in a war this period. Lastly, a country that was in a war
that has now ended, must spend resources to demobilize, and may wish to keep some
assets in a heightened state of alert in case the conflict begins again.
The direct effect is relatively constant across the five matrices, with an average of
approximate 0.115. This implies that if country i were to be in a war, the expected
effect on its defence spending would be an increase of 12%. So if country i had a defence
burden of 2.5% prior to the war, the increase would bring it to 2.80%. This value may
seem small, but one must realize that the size of the war has not been controlled for.
Larger wars are expected to be correlated with larger increases in the defence burden.
Of note is the predicted impact that country i’s action has on the spending of its
neighbours. Depending on the weight matrix used, the indirect effect is larger than the
direct effect. In fact it is possible to map out the spending effects as it moves through
the neighbouring countries. The closer the relationship is between another country and
country i, the larger the expected change in defence burden for that country.
Finally, note the impact that a reduction in civil liberties has on the defence burden.
An increase in the measure of civil liberties is associated with a decline in freedom, or in
other words a movement towards a more authoritarian regime. Table 7 indicates that
this is correlated with an increase in the defence burden. In fact a one point decrease
in freedom has only a slightly smaller impact on the defence burden as going to war
has.
5.1 Robustness Checks
The first robustness check involves including various internal factors that may act as
determinants of the defence burden. The results of these regressions can be found in
Tables 8 and 9. The variables included here have all been used in other studies to test
if internal factors play a role in the determination of defence budgets. Adjusted GDP
per capita, that is GDP with the defence budget removed, provides a measure of the
available resources of the economy. Others have shown that during the Cold War higher
GDPs have been correlated with larger dollar values of military expenditures.10 First,
higher GDPs indicate that there are more assets to defend, and second that with more
resources available, budget setters may be able to acquire a larger share. It is not clear
10Murdoch and Sandler (1984), Looney (1989).
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if the effect will be the same as on the Defence Burden, as increases in GDP, holding
military spending constant, would cause the defence burden to fall.11
Similarly, GDP growth is included to see if the budget setters can claim a larger
share of new resources available.12 The Upcoming Election variable measures whether
defence burdens rise in years before an election is held. It has been hypothesized that
budget setters can use the defence budget to reduce unemployment by hiring soldiers
or increasing procurement.13 Finally, the government size variable is a ratio of the non-
defence component of government spending as a percentage of non-defence GDP. Several
authors have suggested that countries with larger government expenditures represent
an increased ability to finance the defence departments.14 Thus, larger government
sizes are hypothesized to be positively correlated with increased defence burdens.
The results do not support the hypotheses presented by the internal factor literature.
First, GDP per capita is negatively correlated with the defence burden. This might be
the result of increasing returns to scale in military spending. The size of government
is also negatively correlated with the defence burden. This can be explained by the
fact that countries with large government sectors, are most often countries with a large
welfare state. Health and education may be crowding out defence expenditures. Finally,
growth and elections appear completely uncorrelated with the defence burden. The
parameter ρ, remains positive and significant when these internal factors are included,
suggesting that external factors are more important determinants of defence burdens.
It is not known with certainty why the internal factors fail to perform the same way
as in previous studies. One possibility is that with the use of spatial econometrics, it
is possible to handle defence budgets of neighbouring countries in a more appropriate
manner. Accounting for the spatial location of countries may go a long way in explaining
defence budgets. The evidence suggests that spending is positively spatially correlated,
and that internal factors provide little assistance in explaining the defence burden when
these external factors are properly accounted for. A second explanation might be in the
time frame of the data. The post-Cold War time period may be fundamentally different
than the Cold War. During the Cold War, the world was in some ways simpler. There
were two main adversaries, and most countries aligned with one or the other. This
made it clear who’s ones allies and enemies were, simplifying spending decisions. With
increased economic growth in the developing world, regional powers have sprung up
in various regions. The world is no longer polarized, and this may lead to countries
no longer seeing clear battle lines. The result may be to rely more on external factors
11Goldsmith (2003) shows a positive correlation between GDP per capita and Defence Burdens.
12Goldsmith (2003).
13Nincic and Cusack (1979), Griffin, Wallace, and Devine (1982).
14Maizels and Nissanke (1986).
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when setting budgets.
As an additional robustness check, the regressions were run on a year by year basis
under the same specification as in Table 6. The estimated value of rho for each year
is presented in Table 10. Of course, as these regressions are cross-sectional, no loca-
tion fixed effect was included. Instead, a constant was included. For this reason the
estimated values of rho in the year by year case are not centered on the estimated rho
for the full data set. The important thing to notice from this table however, is the
relative constant nature of rho for each weight matrix. Although some yearly variation
exists, the estimates of rho are fairly constant across time. The estimated values of the
Betas on a year by year basis are consistent with the results in Table 6.15 These results
indicate that by using panel data as opposed to a simple cross-section, I am able to
account for a potential upward bias in the measure of ρ by controlling for time-invariant
variables within each country.
Another robustness check was to examine the data for certain regions only. This
presents two challenges. First, with fewer observations for each regression, the efficiency
of the estimates will be reduced. Second, by only examining certain countries, the
implicit assumption is that the defence spending of countries outside these regions do
not impact the spending levels of the countries within each region. Table 11 presents
the regression results for four regions: Latin America, Europe, The Middle East, and
the rest of Asia. Overall, the results are fairly robust to this analysis. The value of rho
is positive and significant for most regions, indicating the continued presence of positive
spatial correlation. The estimates of rho vary from those found in Table 6, but this is
likely the result of omission of the other countries’ defence spending.
One final robustness check was to re-run the regressions with a different dependent
variable. Instead of the defence burden, defence spending per capita in constant 2005
US dollars was used. The results are presented in Table 12. Again, we immediately
see that the estimate of rho is both positive and significant, indicating the presence of
positive spatial correlation in the data. The estimates of rho are similar to those found
in Table 6 for four of the five matrices examined, thus providing more support to the
results found there.
15Full regression results available upon request
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6 Geographic Analysis
With the regression results in hand, it is now possible to examine the data from a
geographic perspective. The local Moran Is provided an indication of what regions
showed strong evidence of positive spatial autocorrelation. These were the Middle East
and Central America. One method to further study the geographic nature of the results
is to examine the residuals from the regressions. The residuals are given by:
Residual = y − ρˆWy − βˆX (3)
Notice that the residual include the fixed effects. Since the interest is in comparing the
results of the model between countries, leaving the fixed effect estimate in the residual
term allows us to more accurately observe how countries differ from one another. A
second variable is created by multiplying the vector of residuals by the weighting matrix
used in the regression.
Thus, for each regression there is a vector of residuals paired with a vector of values
which weights the residuals of all the neighbours of the country, where neighbour is
defined by the weighting matrix used in the regression. For each regression there are
16 pairs for each of the 124 countries.
These pairs can be interpreted as follows. The residual indicates how much more
or less a country is spending on the military than is explained by the model. If the
model is correct, the countries which have positive residuals are countries which tend
to spend more than what would otherwise be expected. On the other hand, countries
with negative residuals are spending less than what otherwise would be expected. If the
value of the matrix weighted residuals for a country is positive this indicates that its
neighbours are spending more than what otherwise would be expected. On the other
hand, if this value is negative its neighbours are spending less than what otherwise
would be expected.
Consequently, a country can be described by one of four characterizations. If both
values are positive, this country could be described as being in an arms race. It is
spending more than predicted, and so too are its neighbours. If both of the values
are negative, then the opposite event is occurring. The country and its neighbours are
both spending less than expected. This anti-arms race could be the result of a mutual
agreement to keep spending low. If the country’s residual is positive but the weighted
residuals is negative then the country can be seen as one that is spending more on the
military while its neighbours are spending less. Finally, if the residual is negative but
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the weighted residual is positive, we observe that a country is underspending according
to the model whilst its neighbours are overspending.
In each year, a country can be classified as one of these four types. It is often the
case that a country is the same type in all 16 years. It is impractical to present the
results for each year and each weighting matrix. Thus, these data are presented for
only three of the five weighting matrices. Additionally, instead of looking at each of
the sixteen years, the average residual and weighted residual were calculated for each
country. By using this method any chance of observing a country changing its type
over the period of the data is abandoned. For most countries this is not an issue.
To analyze the results, only the regression results from Table 6 will be presented.
The three chosen matrices were “Contiguous,” “Two Groups,” and “World Police.”
The latter two were chosen as they are the preferred matrices of the three that were
created for this paper. The “Contiguous” results are presented as a reference.
These data are best understood through use of the maps presented in Figures 1 and
2. In both cases there is clearly certain areas that display clustering. If the regressions
fully supported the hypothesis, clustering of Colour A countries, which indicates positive
clustering at high levels, and clustering of Colour B countries, which indicate positive
spatial clustering at low levels, would be large and separated. Between these would
be countries of Colour B and Colour C. Colour B countries are those who spend more
whilst their neighbours spend less, and countries who are Colour C spend less whist
their neighbours spend more.
In both cases, there is clearly a swath of high spending through the Middle East
and surrounding area, including the Balkans and Northern Africa. Smaller regions of
high spending clusters include parts of Southern Asia and Northwest and Southwest
Africa. This certainly aligns with the traditional views of these areas. The Middle East
is obviously a high spending area due to the numerous conflicts in its recent history.
The India-Pakistan rivalry also causes spending in that area to be higher. The region
of Northwest Africa has also had conflicts, specifically over the territory of Western
Sahara.
Clustering of low spending countries in various regions is also observed. These
include Central America, parts of Europe, Eastern Asia, and parts of Africa. The
Americas have generally been peaceful thanks to the Monroe Doctrine. The existence
of NATO has allowed some European countries to mutually lower their spending. The
African regions may come as a surprise, until one realizes that most of the conflicts in
the region are within state conflicts. Wars between neighbours are rarer.
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The identification of these low spending zones is useful in a number of ways. If
the goal of some countries is to move away from a high spending equilibrium to a low
spending equilibrium, it is necessary to identify zones that are low spending so that one
can understand how they reached this point. Additionally, these low spending zones
may identify regions where more formal cooperation is possible. If a group of countries
have existed in a relatively low spending equilibrium for a number of years, they may
wish to move towards more formal mutual defence agreements. Finally, for investors it
serves to identify countries where investment may be less likely to be destroyed in an
international conflict.
So, although the data may not fit the hypothesis perfectly, as the clustering is not
entirely clean, there is strong evidence to support the notion that there are clusters of
high spending and low spending countries.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses spatial econometric techniques to analyze defence spending patterns of
124 countries during the post-Cold war period. In this period, the analysis indicates
that there was significant evidence of positive spatial correlation in the data, given
the qualitative structure imposed by the weight matrices. These results stand up to
a number of robust checks, including focusing on fewer years, smaller regions, and
differing sets of explanatory variables.
An important component of this paper was the development of weighting matrices
that specifically factored in the ability of countries to project their power abroad. Three
potential weighting matrices were crafted that took account of this factor. Although it is
not possible to say with certainty which weighting matrix represents the true state of the
world, the results from all three are consistent and lend support to the model. Future
work in defence budget research can use this classification and associated weighting
matrices to better understand how countries interact with one another.
The results also point to the benefit of using a panel data set. By using country fixed
effects, I am able to control for the time-invariant unobserved variables that influence
defence spending. As the robustness check that examines the year by year variable
shows, the spatial correlation is fairly constant, but is biased upwards by the omission
of the fixed effects.16 Identifying what these unknown time-invariant country specific
16In regression results not presented here, a similar upward bias is found when the complete panel
data set was analyzed without country fixed effects.
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characteristics could be an interesting future area of research.
Overall, positive spatial correlation was found in the data, under the imposed neigh-
bourhood structure. That is the spending in a country was positively correlated to the
value set by neighbouring countries, as defined by the weighting matrices. Changes in
population were found to have a small impact on the defence burden. Additionally, two
societal measures of civil liberties and whether the country was at war in the previous
year, are both positively correlated with the defence burden.
Analyzing the regression results allowed us to identify regions of the world that
display different spending trends. The Middle East, Southern Asia, and parts of Africa
all displayed positive spatial correlation at high levels. That is to say that countries
in that area spent more than the model predicted. These regions can be classified as
areas where arms racing is occurring. There are also regions that have countries spend
less than the model predicts. These areas include Central America, parts of Europe
Europe, parts of Asia, and Sub-Saharan Western Africa. These can be described as
zones of peace, or areas of anti-arms racing.
The results were subjected to a number of robustness checks, including the addition
of a number of internal factors that other authors have had success using, as well as
yearly and regional analysis of the data. The results were robust to these additions.
Though internal factors may also play a potential role, the analysis here clearly showed
that in the post-Cold War era, external factors were significant. With the removal of
the Soviet Union, there is no longer a polarization of the world. This has allowed for
regional powers to develop. The result is that there are no longer clear battle lines, so
countries must take into account the spending of more countries than they otherwise
would have.
My findings emphasize the need to factor in spatial location when examining defence
budgets. Although advanced weapon systems allow countries to launch limited strikes
anywhere in the world, the threat of invasion is highest from those countries who have
the opportunity and ability to move large number of forces to a given country. A realistic
assessment of this ability was included in this paper. By adhering to this approach, the
regression results provide a clearer picturer of the co-movement of defence burdens.
Overall, the results presented here make a few things clear. First, external factors
are significant determinants of defence budgets. Authors who omit the budgets of other
countries in their regressions could suffer from an omitted variable bias. Second, spatial
econometrics, and the weighting matrices presented here, allow us to more thoroughly
examine and understand the interaction of defence spending between countries. Fi-
nally, different areas of the world exhibit different spending patterns. The approach
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of looking for common trends is helpful at identifying regions that could be examined
independently in the future. An important caveat however, is that regions of the world
do not exist in a vacuum. Though the countries of Central America may spend less
collectively because of mutual cooperation, it is likely they still factor in the decisions of
countries outside of this region when making their decisions. Thus, it is recommended
that further use be made of the spatial econometric techniques. It allows for a formal
and convenient way to account for the action-reaction nature of defence spending.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median St. Dev Min Max
Defence Spending (Percent of GDP) 2.44 1.80 2.05 0.2 17.5
Population (Thousands) 46,167 10,306 149,253 73 1,317,066
Civil Liberties (1 to 7) 3.3 3.0 1.7 1.0 7.0
Adjusted GDP per Capita (2005 $US) 11,719 6,491 12,682 314 85,480
Adjusted GDP Growth (%) 4.29 4.13 5.41 -54.93 44.79
Size of Government (% of GDP) 9.45 7.43 7.01 0.10 39.68
Count
War (Dummy) 263
Election (Dummy) 532
Description: Information on the mean, median, standard deviation, min, and max of the variables
used in the regressions.
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Table 2: Candidates for Type P Countries
Naval Ships (> 10) Air Transport (> 50) Air Combat (> 100) Army Vehicles (> 1000)
China(236) USA(1296) USA(3609) Russia(54459)
USA(214) Russia(423) China(2026) USA(37005)
Russia(130) China(386) Russia(1909) China(13752)
Japan(71) India(278) India(829) Turkey(9666)
India(47) Turkey(189) Japan(653) Syria(9490)
Taiwan(45) Brazil(186) Israel(640) Israel(9015)
Indonesia(44) Mexico(150) Egypt(589) Egypt(8834)
France(41) Iran(135) South Korea(588) Ukraine(8058)
South Korea(41) Colombia(129) Taiwan(500) Saudi Arabia(7617)
Turkey(37) Japan(124) France(489) France(7140)
United Kingdom(36) Venezuela(123) Pakistan(449) India(6234)
Iran(32) United Kingdom(109) United Kingdom(377) South Korea(6025)
Greece(27) Thailand(108) Syria(365) Pakistan(4046)
Italy(27) Spain(101) Iran(339) Italy(4042)
Brazil(25) Germany(95) Turkey(338) Greece(3962)
Germany(22) Italy(92) Saudi Arabia(296) United Kingdom(3678)
Australia(20) Bolivia(87) Greece(288) Kazakhstan(3192)
Canada(19) Argentina(84) Ukraine(267) Algeria(3110)
Pakistan(19) Greece(75) Italy(263) Poland(3060)
Peru(19) Saudi Arabia(73) Brazil(247) Iran(3028)
Thailand(19) Indonesia(73) Spain(209) Germany(2937)
Chile(17) Ukraine(66) Thailand(186) Spain(2932)
Spain(17) Australia(62) Germany(182) Taiwan(2845)
Egypt(15) Egypt(60) Kazakhstan(162) Singapore(2615)
Singapore(15) Canada(60) Australia(147) South Africa(2353)
Argentina(14) Israel(58) Argentina(143) Jordan(2308)
Malaysia(12) Ecuador(57) Singapore(134) Romania(2060)
Netherlands(12) South Africa(55) Belarus(128) Morocco(2001)
Venezuela(12) Philippines(55) Algeria(125) Yemen(1914)
Norway(11) Chile(53) Jordan(115) Belarus(1890)
Algeria(10) Algeria(51) Sweden(115) Switzerland(1883)
Mexico(10) Morocco(51) Poland(112) Thailand(1808)
Angola(50) Finland(109) Japan(1780)
Venezuela(102) Brazil(1722)
Australia(1653)
Lebanon(1636)
Canada(1546)
Bulgaria(1545)
Malaysia(1466)
Nigeria(1369)
Indonesia(1324)
Angola(1320)
Sudan(1239)
Argentina(1228)
Kuwait(1188)
Sweden(1123)
Azerbaijan(1001)
Description: A list of countries that satisfy each of the four criteria used to identify a type P
country. These criteria are having 10 or more Blue Water naval vessels, 50 or more transport aircraft,
100 or more combat aircraft, and 1000 or more army vehicles.
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Table 3: Type P Countries
Algeria(4) Germany(4) Pakistan(3) Turkey(4)
Argentina(4) Greece(4) Russia(4) Ukraine(3)
Australia(4) India(4) Saudi Arabia(3) United Kingdom(4)
Brazil(4) Indonesia(3) Singapore(3) United States(4)
Canada(3) Iran(4) South Korea(3) Venezuela(3)
China(4) Israel(3) Spain(4)
Egypt(4) Italy(4) Taiwan(3)
France(3) Japan(4) Thailand(4)
Description: The 29 countries who satisfy three or more of the criteria identified in Table 2. The
number in brackets indicates how many of the criteria each country satisfied.
Table 4: Alliances
European Union NATO CSTO
Austria Belgium Armenia
Belgium Canada Belarus
Denmark Czech Republic Kazakhstan
Finland Denmark Kyrgyzstan
France France Russia
Germany Germany Tajikistan
Greece Greece
Ireland Hungary Pairwise Alliances
Italy Iceland South Korea
Luxembourg Italy United States
Netherlands Luxembourg
Portugal Netherlands Philippines
Spain Norway United States
Sweden Poland
United Kingdom Portugal Australia
Spain New Zealand
SCO Turkey
China United Kingdom Australia
Kazakhstan United States United States
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Description: Alliances that were factored into the weighting matrices.
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Table 5: Summary of Weighting Matrices
Matrix Description
1. Inverse Distances Values are inverted capital pair distances. All non-allied
countries receive a positive weight.
2. Contiguous Values are binary. Only non-allied contiguous countries
receive a weight of 1.
3. Two Groups Values are inverted capital pair distances. Type Ps give
a positive weight to non-allied Type Ps and non-allied
contiguous countries. Type Qs give a positive weight to
non-allied contiguous countries.
4. World Police Values are inverted capital pair distances. Type Ps give
a positive weight to all non-allied countries. Type Qs
give a positive weight to non-allied contiguous countries.
5. Who can get me? Values are inverted capital pair distances. Type Ps give
a positive weight to all non-allied Type Ps and non-allied
contiguous countries. Type Qs give a positive weight to
all non-allied Type Ps and non-allied contiguous coun-
tries.
Description: A summary of the five weighting matrices used in the paper. Note the numbers
associated with each name, as they will be used in the presentation of the regression results.
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Table 6: Baseline Case
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Rho 0.6265∗∗∗ 0.1951∗∗∗ 0.1990∗∗∗ 0.2047∗∗∗ 0.3763∗∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0271) (0.0263) (0.0276) (0.0413)
Population (Logged) 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Lagged War 0.1179∗∗∗ 0.1133∗∗∗ 0.1133∗∗∗ 0.1127∗∗∗ 0.1166∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0216)
Civil Liberties 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0956∗∗∗ 0.0958∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0100)
R-Squared 0.8879 0.8833 0.8837 0.8838 0.8856
Correlation Squared 0.1437 0.1609 0.1607 0.1603 0.1689
Log Likelihood 44.6499 7.6096 10.0045 12.0956 23.4897
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 1984 Observations. Country Fixed Effects.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
Table 7: Baseline Case: Effects Breakdown
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Direct 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗ 0.0099∗∗ 0.0096∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗
SE (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Population (Logged) Indirect 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗
SE (0.0100) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0028)
Total 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗ 0.0121∗∗ 0.0118∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗
SE (0.0127) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0062)
Direct 0.1197∗∗∗ 0.1142∗∗∗ 0.1136∗∗∗ 0.1158∗∗∗ 0.1188∗∗∗
SE (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0213)
Lagged War Indirect 0.2014∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0700∗∗∗
SE (0.0563) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0177)
Total 0.3211∗∗∗ 0.1392∗∗∗ 0.1387∗∗∗ 0.1427∗∗∗ 0.1888∗∗∗
SE (0.0720) (0.0264) (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0362)
Direct 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.0817∗∗∗
SE (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0103)
Civil Liberties Indirect 0.1073∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
SE (0.0275) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0098)
Total 0.1711∗∗∗ 0.1178∗∗∗ 0.1175∗∗∗ 0.1192∗∗∗ 0.1297∗∗∗
SE (0.0343) (0.0122) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0176)
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 1984 Observations. Country Fixed Effects.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
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Table 8: Internal Factors Included
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Rho 0.6245∗∗∗ 0.2022∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.2116∗∗∗ 0.3793∗∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0267) (0.0261) (0.0272) (0.0410)
Population (Logged) 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138)
Lagged War 0.1141∗∗∗ 0.1079∗∗∗ 0.1080∗∗∗ 0.1071∗∗∗ 0.1118∗∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0212)
Civil Liberties 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0720∗∗∗ 0.0714∗∗∗ 0.0714∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)
GDP per Capita (Logged) -0.0716∗∗∗ -0.1142∗∗∗ -0.1186∗∗∗ -0.1175∗∗∗ -0.1069∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248)
Upcoming Election -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0011
(0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126)
GDP Growth -0.0012 -0.0019∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0016
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Government Size (Logged) -0.1752∗∗∗ -0.1610∗∗∗ -0.1590∗∗∗ -0.1594∗∗∗ -0.1637∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0223)
R-Squared 0.8923 0.8881 0.8886 0.8887 0.8903
Correlation Squared 0.1804 0.1945 0.1947 0.1948 0.2038
Log Likelihood 84.2057 49.3116 52.3019 54.3808 65.0036
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 1984 Observations. Country Fixed Effects.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
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Table 9: Internal Factors Included: Effects Breakdown
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Direct 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.0941∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗
SE (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0146)
Population (Logged) Indirect 0.1372∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗
SE (0.0366) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0134)
Total 0.2195∗∗∗ 0.1129∗∗∗ 0.1149∗∗∗ 0.1170∗∗∗ 0.1489∗∗∗
SE (0.0460) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0259)
Direct 0.1148∗∗∗ 0.1101∗∗∗ 0.1095∗∗∗ 0.1084∗∗∗ 0.1128∗∗∗
SE (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0220)
Lagged War Indirect 0.1916∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗
SE (0.0539) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0176)
Total 0.3063∗∗∗ 0.1349∗∗∗ 0.1339∗∗∗ 0.1347∗∗∗ 0.1803∗∗∗
SE (0.0694) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0262) (0.0370)
Direct 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0727∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
SE (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0113)
Civil Liberties Indirect 0.0779∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗
SE (0.0235) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0086)
Total 0.1247∗∗∗ 0.0893∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0952∗∗∗
SE (0.0317) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0184)
Direct -0.0726∗∗∗ -0.1146∗∗∗ -0.1191∗∗∗ -0.1184∗∗∗ -0.1071∗∗∗
SE (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0248) (0.0245) (0.0257)
GDP per Capita (Logged) Indirect -0.1207∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗
SE (0.0478) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0193)
Total -0.1933∗∗∗ -0.1404∗∗∗ -0.1456∗∗∗ -0.1472∗∗∗ -0.1712∗∗∗
SE (0.0692) (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0309) (0.0429)
Direct -0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0010
SE (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0126)
Upcoming Election Indirect -0.0025 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006
SE (0.0221) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0077)
Total -0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0016
SE (0.0348) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0203)
Direct -0.0012 -0.0019∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0019∗ -0.0017
SE (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
GDP Growth Indirect -0.0019 -0.0004∗ -0.0004∗ -0.0005∗ -0.0010
SE (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Total -0.0031 -0.0024∗ -0.0025∗ -0.0024∗ -0.0028
SE (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0018)
Direct -0.1770∗∗∗ -0.1618∗∗∗ -0.1600∗∗∗ -0.1615∗∗∗ -0.1662∗∗∗
SE (0.0228) (0.0225) (0.0213) (0.0224) (0.0231)
Government Size (Logged) Indirect -0.2956∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗ -0.0997∗∗∗
SE (0.0749) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0229)
Total -0.4725∗∗∗ -0.1983∗∗∗ -0.1956∗∗∗ -0.2007∗∗∗ -0.2659∗∗∗
SE (0.0891) (0.0286) (0.0266) (0.0284) (0.0422)
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 1984 Observations. Country Fixed Effects.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
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Table 10: Yearly Rhos
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
1993 0.8375∗∗∗ 0.3711∗∗∗ 0.4460∗∗∗ 0.4547∗∗∗ 0.6394∗∗∗
(0.1048) (0.0874) (0.0817) (0.0853) (0.1202)
1994 0.8804∗∗∗ 0.4112∗∗∗ 0.4670∗∗∗ 0.4856∗∗∗ 0.6624∗∗∗
(0.0794) (0.0890) (0.0819) (0.0850) (0.1213)
1995 0.8515∗∗∗ 0.3362∗∗∗ 0.4200∗∗∗ 0.4407∗∗∗ 0.6284∗∗∗
(0.0975) (0.0923) (0.0844) (0.0876) (0.1265)
1996 0.8805∗∗∗ 0.4032∗∗∗ 0.4930∗∗∗ 0.5056∗∗∗ 0.6964∗∗∗
(0.0792) (0.0907) (0.0812) (0.0844) (0.1147)
1997 0.8565∗∗∗ 0.4012∗∗∗ 0.4590∗∗∗ 0.4697∗∗∗ 0.5863∗∗∗
(0.0945) (0.0921) (0.0858) (0.0894) (0.1379)
1998 0.8515∗∗∗ 0.3881∗∗∗ 0.4610∗∗∗ 0.4756∗∗∗ 0.5733∗∗∗
(0.0972) (0.0930) (0.0854) (0.0888) (0.1374)
1999 0.8516∗∗∗ 0.4032∗∗∗ 0.4800∗∗∗ 0.4977∗∗∗ 0.5964∗∗∗
(0.0972) (0.0914) (0.0831) (0.0860) (0.1343)
2000 0.8555∗∗∗ 0.3952∗∗∗ 0.4360∗∗∗ 0.4427∗∗∗ 0.5564∗∗∗
(0.0947) (0.0907) (0.0857) (0.0894) (0.1390)
2001 0.8285∗∗∗ 0.4031∗∗∗ 0.4410∗∗∗ 0.4357∗∗∗ 0.5634∗∗∗
(0.1111) (0.0902) (0.0852) (0.0898) (0.1394)
2002 0.8555∗∗∗ 0.4172∗∗∗ 0.4681∗∗∗ 0.4796∗∗∗ 0.5934∗∗∗
(0.0949) (0.0911) (0.0852) (0.0887) (0.1359)
2003 0.8225∗∗∗ 0.4161∗∗∗ 0.4550∗∗∗ 0.4657∗∗∗ 0.5803∗∗∗
(0.1146) (0.0897) (0.0853) (0.0888) (0.1366)
2004 0.8595∗∗∗ 0.3901∗∗∗ 0.4280∗∗∗ 0.4286∗∗∗ 0.5854∗∗∗
(0.0923) (0.0921) (0.0878) (0.0922) (0.1364)
2005 0.8585∗∗∗ 0.3722∗∗∗ 0.4070∗∗∗ 0.4076∗∗∗ 0.5624∗∗∗
(0.0930) (0.0943) (0.0902) (0.0950) (0.1405)
2006 0.8575∗∗∗ 0.3691∗∗∗ 0.4170∗∗∗ 0.4017∗∗∗ 0.5864∗∗∗
(0.0937) (0.0948) (0.0899) (0.0958) (0.1374)
2007 0.8495∗∗∗ 0.3452∗∗∗ 0.3940∗∗∗ 0.3947∗∗∗ 0.5464∗∗∗
(0.0988) (0.0965) (0.0918) (0.0963) (0.1447)
2008 0.7845∗∗∗ 0.2402∗∗ 0.3410∗∗∗ 0.3357∗∗∗ 0.4814∗∗∗
(0.1375) (0.1033) (0.0956) (0.1005) (0.1549)
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 124 observations per regression.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
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Table 11: Regional Analysis
Defence Burden (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Rho 0.4572∗∗∗ 0.2120∗∗∗ 0.2196∗∗∗ 0.2203∗∗∗ 0.3075∗∗∗
(0.0790) (0.0740) (0.0699) (0.0737) (0.0752)
Population (Logged) 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0209∗ 0.0198∗ 0.0200∗ 0.0238∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0108)
Middle East Lagged War 0.0622 0.0543 0.0533 0.0540 0.0574
(0.0450) (0.0469) (0.0467) (0.0468) (0.0460)
Civil Liberties 0.1189∗∗∗ 0.1619∗∗∗ 0.1603∗∗∗ 0.1598∗∗∗ 0.1487∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0290)
Log Likelihood 41.1330 34.6120 35.1800 35.0600 37.4320
R-Squared 0.8776 0.8677 0.8686 0.8682 0.8722
Correlation Squared 0.3528 0.3849 0.3879 0.3847 0.3999
Rho 0.5221 0.3916 0.3958 0.4379 0.4537
(0.0717)∗∗∗ (0.0569)∗∗∗ (0.0536)∗∗∗ (0.0543)∗∗∗ (0.0575)∗∗∗
Population (Logged) -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0029
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108)
Latin America Lagged War 0.0767 0.0789 0.0793 0.0784 0.0774
(0.0579) (0.0584) (0.0568) (0.0558) (0.0564)
Civil Liberties 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.0791∗∗∗ 0.0824∗∗∗ 0.0734∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0208)
Log Likelihood 86.5260 83.0360 89.4890 93.7400 90.7560
R-Squared 0.9103 0.9086 0.9137 0.9167 0.9149
Correlation Squared 0.1751 0.1767 0.1619 0.1701 0.1646
Rho 0.3745 0.1234 0.0680 0.1301 0.0566
(0.0821)∗∗∗ (0.0581)∗∗ (0.0549) (0.0603)∗∗ (0.0591)
Population (Logged) 0.0058 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065)
Europe Lagged War 0.1523∗∗∗ 0.1525∗∗∗ 0.1528∗∗∗ 0.1529∗∗∗ 0.1532∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0427) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0429)
Civil Liberties 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗ 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0913∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0196)
Log Likelihood 46.3100 39.5280 38.4160 39.9580 38.1240
R-Squared 0.8154 0.8096 0.8084 0.8099 0.8081
Correlation Squared 0.0852 0.0962 0.0925 0.0965 0.0891
Rho 0.4970∗∗∗ 0.2210∗∗∗ 0.3320∗∗∗ 0.3480∗∗∗ 0.4975∗∗∗
(0.0802) (0.0532) (0.0522) (0.0570) (0.0632)
Population (Logged) -0.0095 -0.0213∗∗ -0.0176∗ -0.0148 -0.0116
(0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Asia Lagged War 0.1705∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗ 0.1288∗∗ 0.1245∗∗ 0.1569∗∗∗
(0.0556) (0.0574) (0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0554)
Civil Liberties 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.1254∗∗∗ 0.1189∗∗∗ 0.1109∗∗∗ 0.1034∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0289) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0280)
Log Likelihood -32.4740 -43.1100 -36.0470 -36.0590 -32.6180
R-Squared 0.8097 0.7974 0.8079 0.8068 0.8113
Correlation Squared 0.1116 0.1025 0.1057 0.1012 0.1371
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
Table 12: Defence Spending per Capita
Defence Spending per Capita (Logged) 1 2 3 4 5
Rho 0.2685∗∗∗ 0.2122∗∗∗ 0.2200∗∗∗ 0.2247∗∗∗ 0.3294∗∗∗
(0.0407) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0216) (0.0322)
Population (Logged) 0.2102∗∗∗ 0.2114∗∗∗ 0.2104∗∗∗ 0.2095∗∗∗ 0.2083∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051)
Lagged War 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.0847∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0283)
Civil Liberties -0.0695∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗∗ -0.0800∗∗∗ -0.0770∗∗∗ -0.0708∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0133)
Log Likelihood -540.4000 -518.4100 -507.5800 -508.1900 -508.8100
R-Squared 0.9699 0.9708 0.9712 0.9711 0.9711
Correlation Squared 0.6244 0.6251 0.6278 0.6272 0.6305
Description: Standard Errors in Brackets. 1984 Observations. Country Fixed Effects.
* 10% Significance. ** 5% Significance. *** 1% Significance.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: Residuals and Weighted Residuals (Contiguous)
Description: A map of the 124 countries in the sample, where the colour indicates the defence
spending behaviour relative to that of its neighbours, as defined by the weight matrix. Colour A:
High spending country with high spending neighbours. Colour B: High spending country with low
spending neighbours. Colour C: Low spending country with high spending neighbours. Colour D:
Low spending country with low spending neighbours. Colour E: No data. Note the grouping of
Colour A countries in the Middle East and parts of Africa and the grouping of Colour D countries in
Central America, parts of Africa, and parts of Asia.
34
Figure 2: Residuals and Weighted Residuals (Two Groups)
Description: A map of the 124 countries in the sample, where the colour indicates the defence
spending behaviour relative to that of its neighbours, as defined by the weight matrix. Colour A:
High spending country with high spending neighbours. Colour B: High spending country with low
spending neighbours. Colour C: Low spending country with high spending neighbours. Colour D:
Low spending country with low spending neighbours. Colour E: No data. Note the grouping of
Colour A countries in the Middle East, and parts of Africa, Europe, and Asia. Also, note the
grouping of Colour D countries in Central America, and parts of Africa and Asia.
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